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Abstract. Th is essay sets out to explain how educational semiotics as a discipline can 
be used to reform medical education and assessment. Th is is in response to an ongoing 
paradigm shift in medical education and assessment that seeks to integrate more 
qualitative, ethical and professional aspects of medicine into curricula, and develop 
ways to assess them. Th is paper suggests that a method to drive this paradigm change 
might be found in the Peircean idea of suprasubjectivity. Th is semiotic concept is rooted 
in the scholastic philosophy of John of St Th omas, but has been reintroduced to modern 
semiotics through the works of John Deely, Alin Olteanu and, most notably, Charles 
Sanders Peirce. I approach this task as both a medical educator and a semiotician. 
In this paper, I provide background information about medical education, paradigm 
shift s, and the concept of suprasubjectivity in relation to modern educational semiotic 
literature. I conclude by giving examples of what a suprasubjective approach to medical 
education and assessment might look like. I do this by drawing an equivalence between 
the notion of threshold concepts and suprasubjectivity, demonstrating the similarities 
between their positions. Fundamentally, medical education suff ers from tensions of 
teaching trainee doctors the correct balance of biological science and situational ethics/
judgement. In the transcendence of mind-dependent and mind-independent being the 
scholastic philosophy of John of St Th omas may be exactly the solution medicine needs 
to overcome this dichotomy. 
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Introduction
One of the fundaments of medicine is that the tuition and assessment of the medical 
profession is predicated on an ontological question, namely: what attributes and 
skills make for a good doctor (Huxham et al. 1989; O’Neil 2010; Conti 2005; 
Patel 2007). Before one can realistically determine what it is appropriate to teach, 
and which skills in particular need to be assessed, one has to ascribe utility and 
effi  caciousness to those particular areas. A fundamental tension exists between 
producing students that can both account for the personal and emotional needs of 
patients, and act as vessels to be fi lled with biomedical knowledge. Th at is to say, there 
needs to be a synergy between the medical student as an applied scientist and a medical 
humanist (Hurwitz, Vass 2002) who considers the human and societal facets of the 
man or woman that stands before them, as well as the pathogen inside the patient. 
In the search to defi ne what qualities a good doctor should have, some have 
taken a patient-centred approach, by surveying the public (Bleakley 2014) who, 
as the recipients of care, have a central role in defi ning what makes a good doctor 
(Leahy et al. 2003; Fones et al. 1998). Th ese factors themselves are, however, 
subject to change on some level, as the demographics and proclivities of patients 
can change within a society. Yet the role the doctor plays as a scientist is fi xed in 
the sense that biological cause and eff ect will not change. As Leone (2017: 119) 
has noted, “given a cardiac arrest, you inject epinephrine, that’s it”; the biological 
relationship between subject and object is determined at a chemical level. For this 
reason Sullivan (2003: 1595) associates subjective assessment in medicine with 
taking the patients’ point of view into account: “Th e physicians’ job description 
will be changed to focus on patients’ lives rather than patients’ bodies.” 
Th e fact that such a dichotomy exists places us in a predicament, where we 
must ensure the peaceful co-existence between the need to teach students what 
is objectively real; and the subjective environs and variable contexts within which 
we all exist. Such struggles have been in the minds of medical educators and 
assessors since the 1980s (Sloan et al. 1996; Ansell et al. 1979). More recently, it 
has been recognized as a consequence of this, that we are not producing doctors fi t 
to deliver care in the 21st century (Institute of Medicine 2001; Frenk et al. 2010). 
As a medical educator I would echo Holmboe (2017) in this regard, that medical 
education should include,
[…] an emphasis on competencies beyond medical knowledge and basic clinical 
skills, such as systems thinking, quality improvement, interprofessional teamwork, 
and patient safety, while concomitantly attending to identity formation, wellness, 
and resilience. (Holmboe 2017: 2)
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Medical humanities can off er these skills, and semiotics contributes to what Peirce 
called the growth “in concrete reasonableness” (CP 1.590, 1903), and so towards 
a greater good (Peirce 1903). 
Over the last several decades encouraging progress has been made in the pursuit 
to more evenly balance the teaching of each of these two positions to students in 
Western/Anglophone nations, primarily by the development of medical humanities 
subjects in medical schools (Gordon 2005), which has brought more patient-oriented 
values into the curriculum (McManus 1995). Th is is notable, given how medical 
education has traditionally (with intelligible reason) privileged biological fact over 
subjective context, leading academics and practitioners to favour one approach over 
the other and remain confi ned to their respective silos. Consequently, the teaching 
of contextual areas in medical practise, such as the ability of doctors to deal with 
ambiguity, is something that in recent years has fallen upon the medical humanities 
to deliver (Cox et al. 2003). I have illustrated this in Fig. 1.
Figure 1. Diff erences between the philosophical and methodological foundations of medical 
humanities and clinical science.
In this paper, I outline some of the current issues associated with the paradigm 
shift  that is occurring in medical education, and then propose how semiotics as a 
framework might help to account for or even overcome the tension in medicine 
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associated with the dichotomy of objective and subjective forms of knowledge 
shown in Fig. 1. Primarily, medical education and assessment is in search of a 
disciplinary counterpart that can help account for the subjectivity of experience 
and specifi city of individual processes that bio-statistical data cannot adequately 
address. In this paper, I am also concerned with how medical humanities (as a vehicle 
for understanding and dealing with ambiguity) might be more successfully integrated 
into core medical education curricula, as part of this paradigm shift .
Th is paper specifi cally engages with a semiotic theory related to the works of 
Charles Sanders Peirce, and why semiotics might be a useful frame to explore 
medical education and assessment. Th is concerns the idea of suprasubjectivity and 
how it might be a basis for re-framing medical education and assessment as a whole, 
to allow it to better integrate qualitative forms of assessment and humanistic practises 
into medicine. For further discussions about scholastic realism and the interplay 
between subjective and objective being see Sonesson 2018. Th is paper summarizes 
how semiotics as a meta-theory can drive paradigm shift s in medical education. Th e 
paper concludes that scholastic realism, which underpins various semiotic schools 
of thought (Deely, Cobley 2010), could become a well-balanced counterpoise for the 
scientifi c realism that underpins much of biology (French 2011).
A shift in medical assessment? 
Th e epistemological shift  in medical education to which this paper previously 
alluded is essentially about determining where the balance in Fig. 1 is set, between 
clinical and humanistic skills. Th e increasing need for patient-centred medicine, 
however, has involved overcoming a variety of challenges, primarily, turning policy 
and rhetoric into an implementable reality (Barry, Edgman-Levitan 2012). In 
medical education, tuition is still (understandably) weighted in favour of clinical 
subjects. Even though much progress has been made in introducing medical 
humanities to the curricula of undergraduate and postgraduate medical students, 
they are oft en treated as supplementary, decorative subjects (Belling 2010), rather 
than fundamental to the learning of the students. 
However, perhaps surprisingly, one area where there does seem to be an 
appetite for change, and a will to incorporate subjectivity into practice, is within 
medical assessment and psychometrics1. Medical assessment as a subject is 
concerned with ensuring the exams medical students take are valid, and the 
knowledge, skills and attributes used to teach trainee doctors are accurately 
1 This subject uses assessment results and statistics to determine the validity of examinations. 
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assessed (Howley 2004). When we consider the fundamental question introduced 
at the beginning of the paper – what attributes and skills make good doctors? – 
medical assessors are tasked with ensuring the exams students take accurately 
refl ect the skills and qualities that we2 have deemed to be good. Consequently, the 
goal alignment between the medical curriculum and the assessment is critical in 
this area (Bloomfi eld et al. 2003). Once more, a fundamental tension arises that the 
qualitative values which make a good doctor: empathy, resilience etc., are reduced 
to test scores that can be statistically manipulated to establish grade boundaries. 
Such methods of assessment are epistemologically inconsistent and ill equipped 
to measure the constructs they are trying to assess. 
More recently, though, there has been a move to incorporate qualitative 
assessment measures into the examinations of medical students to counteract 
this issue primarily exemplifi ed by the introduction of narrative assessment in 
medicine; both in the USA (Ginsburg et al. 2015; Cook et al. 2015; Cook et al. 
2016; Regehr et al. 2012; Hanson et al. 2013) and also in the Netherlands through 
programmatic assessment as championed by Schuwirth and Van Der Vleuten 
(2011). Important to note also is a paper by Cook et al. (2016) titled “When 
assessment data are words”, which speaks directly to this issue.
Th ere were signs of this shift  in the keynote speeches of prominent assessment 
academics at the 2016 annual transaction of the European Board of Medical 
Assessors in Exeter, UK. Several interesting discourses emerged about the future 
of medicine and medical education. Th e conference addressed how the boundaries 
between medical assessment and other subjects might be crossed, and so gave 
insight to future developments of the fi eld. 
Some of the maxims that encapsulated this position were that medical assessors 
should learn to “embrace the subjective” and consider the transition from 
‘numbers’ to ‘numbers and words’ forms of assessment, the latter being a move 
from purely psychometric assessment to the integration of qualitative measures of 
assessment, or considering how to append existing assessments with qualitative 
aspects. Particularly salient at the conference was Chris McManus’s keynote talk 
“Failing to cross boundaries: Is remediation possible and how much extras training 
is needed?”3 which highlighted the diffi  culties posed by trying to assess cumulative 
and progressive attainment data, and produce a reliable estimate of how much 
2 Th e key issue being here, who defi nes what a good doctor is? Th ere are many answers 
including patients, the public, doctors themselves, medical regulators etc., many of which have 
confl icting interests. 
3 McManus, Chris 2016. Failing to cross boundaries: Is remediation possible, and how much 
extra training is needed? Keynote talk given at the EBMA Annual Academic Conference Crossing 
Boundaries – Assessment in Medical Education, Exeter, United Kingdom, 14 October 2016.
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more education a remedial student requires before they can return to the status 
quo, i.e. re-join their classes. 
Th e keynote speech had strong elements of dialectical reasoning as a metho-
dology aiming at overcoming some of the epistemological limitations of 
psychometric assessment data, in the sense that when all the existing quantitative 
assessment data on the subject of remediation was collected, an answer to the 
question could still not be provided. Th is was a result of variability in the data, 
moreover the issue that quantifi cation itself also contains philosophical limitations 
as to what it can possibly explain, especially when applied to inherently subjective 
assessments such as remediation. Such a position also highlights some of the 
existing limitations of assessing issues of professionalism like remediation through 
“big data”. In sum, assessment data, even in large quantities, is too variable to 
provide accurate enough answers to a question about qualitative thresholds; or put 
more simply, what level of knowledge is required to make a good doctor?
Th is points towards the direction outlined. A shift  would be required in the 
culture of assessment (of remediation in this case) to more meaningfully answer 
the question how much more education and remedial training do students require 
before they can return to practice. McManus’ keynote, and others at the conference, 
recognized this. 
It would seem that we are at the nascent stages of a move towards integrating 
qualitative assessment in medical education. As such, it is prudent to remember 
that medical education is by no means the fi rst discipline to go through a rupture. 
In the next section, I explore how the works of Gaston Bachelard and his successors 
may be of use in learning how to negotiate this new and uncertain intellectual 
territory.
A background to paradigm shifts
Medical education and assessment are not the fi rst disciplines to try to bear the 
cross of paradigm shift s. Given this, it is prudent to consider some potential 
sources of guidance from those scholars who have previously sought to solve the 
epistemological problems associated with crossing boundaries into diff erent subject 
areas. 
Approaches to the integration of such seemingly contradictory positions has 
a longer pedigree than one might expect: its genesis can be traced to French 
philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962) and his concept of 
epistemological rupture. Epistemological rupture or rupture épistémologique in 
its proper designation has had a profound impact on the development of both 
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quantitative and qualitative approaches to science. In the moment that medical 
educators are posing existential questions about bridging the gap between 
subjective and objective knowledge, it is worthy of discussion. Bachelard’s work 
proved to be influential over several modern thinkers including Althusser, 
Bourdieu, Foucault, but also notably Th omas Kuhn’s notion of paradigm shift s. 
Whilst Bachelard was concerned with shift s in scientifi c perspective, some of 
his modern-day adherents, who took his work as a maître à penser, were also 
interested in critiquing and extolling the virtues of approaches that attempt 
syncretic integration such as mixed methods research, for example Bourdieu, who 
said his method was to:
[…] use Weber against Weber to go beyond Weber. In the same way one should 
follow Marx’s advice when he said ‘I am not a Marxist’ and be an anti-Marxist 
Marxist. One may think with Weber or Durkheim, or both, against Marx to go 
beyond Marx and, sometimes, to do what Marx could have done, in his own logic. 
(Bourdieu 1988: 780)  
It is worth noting that this approach is not novel but was devised by Bruno Bauer 
when he undertook to turn Hegel against himself in a method he called critical 
criticism (Marx, and Hegel 1956[1845]). It is this dialectic or “le mouvement 
d’enveloppement” (Bachelard 1940: 137), aiming at a continuous critique of a work 
through its own means, which helps to expose the paradoxical logic or limitations 
that can be found within a scheme or discipline. Much like the events that occurred 
in McManus’s keynote talk.
Bourdieu went on to broaden Bachelard’s (1968[1934]) conceptions of 
epistemo logical rupture to include the process by which one causes a rupture in 
both the narrow confi nes of scientifi c epistemology and also a break with sens 
practique or “common sense” (Mesny 2002). From this, it is evident that Bourdieu 
wished to achieve a social rupture as much as an epistemological one (Barnard 
1991). Th is concept is key to understanding the integration of opposing scientifi c 
structures, a process that Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) termed social praxeology. 
Th is resurfaces in his work Th e Science of Science and Refl exivity (Bourdieu 2004), 
the key point being that our medical education paradigm shift  in part refl ects a 
change in the wider cultural milieu of what is expected of doctors, and so it is not 
unfi tting that this shift  is designed to have social consequences as to how we teach 
and assess medicine. Th e implications of this would seem to be that we must try 
to foster a culture in medical education where the position of medical humanities 
is less marginal and more central to the purpose of educating doctors. 
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Yet another French thinker to introduce to a discussion on paradigms is Michel 
Foucault, specifi cally the work in his publication Th e Order of Th ings (Les Mots et 
les Choses), where he introduced the concept of ‘epistemes’, which set the general 
conditions in knowledge for a certain period of time. Although Foucault never 
specifi cally used the term ‘paradigm change’ himself (Rabinow, Dreyfus 1982), 
both terms are still associated with a Gestalt Shift  (DesAutels 1996). It is clear 
that epistemes make use of the notion of paradigm, although, their focus is more 
on how discourse becomes the methodology by which we historically articulate a 
paradigm. Hence, the key diff erentiation here is that the genealogical method of 
Foucault is much more historically-based (a-priori) than the sociological approach 
of Bourdieu or even Bachelard. That being said, the Foucauldian conception 
of paradigm change, with a greater historical emphasis may position us closer 
to Peirce (Cardoso 2016), with a greater emphasis on materiality than social 
structures (Keane 2003). 
Th ere is a meaningful and current debate in medical education about paradigm 
shift s (Pellegrino 1999; Gallagher et al. 2005; Scalese et al. 2008; Iobst et al. 2010; 
Holmboe et al. 2017). Holmboe in particular looks at the diffi  culties of shift ing 
approaches to medical education in terms of undergraduate and postgraduate 
courses in Canada. In his paper “Competency-based medical education and the 
ghost of Kuhn: Refl ections on the messy and meaningful work of transformation” 
he states:
Much of the tension and polarity revolve around how more eff ectively to prepare 
students and residents to work in and help change a complex health care system 
[…] Th eir primary purpose is to help facilitate implementation of an outcomes-
based approach by creating shared mental models of the competencies, which in 
turn can help to improve curricula and assessment. (Holmboe 2017: 1)
Th is is also my aspiration for the paradigm shift  occurring in the UK, but I would 
argue that medical humanities would lead to an increasing focus on process-based 
assessment rather than outcomes. Holmboe (2017: 2) does, however, highlight 
that regardless of the direction we wish to take, “paradigm shift s are messy and 
threatening, both for those wanting to remain with the older paradigm and those 
pushing the newer paradigm” (Holmboe 2017: 2), as Kuhn also notes (Kuhn 1962).
Bachelard’s epistemological rupture helps us comprehend that scientifi c progress 
can and has been predicated on the position of integrating seemingly contradictory 
elements, rather than continuing in the prevailing direction in an appeal to 
common sense. Moreover, it is fundamentally connected to catering to the needs of 
society as they change. What we must warn against, however, is the issue Gwendie 
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Camp highlights, where paradigm shift  towards humanistic medical education 
and assessment becomes a semantic sleight of hand or “passing fad” (Camp 1996), 
rather than a lasting change. 
The spectrum of subjectivity in semiotics, 
can it help us fi nd a solution? 
Up to now, I have introduced issues associated with education and assessment 
in medicine. Th e following section is concerned with connecting semiotics to 
education and making recommendations about how this area might off er solutions 
to the current impasse in medical education. As such, this paper aligns with Shank 
(1995: 1), who wished to “show how qualitative research in education and semiotics 
can be brought together for the benefi t of each fi eld”. However, my focus in this 
paper specifi cally relates to medical education. 
Th e use of semiotics to analyse educational practise has been applied in a 
variety of diff erent areas, including mathematics (Morgan 2006), general science 
(Lemke 1987), biology (Jaipal 2010) and many more. Th e connection between the 
two subjects is not a new intervention in academic thought, but an approach based 
on an older academic landscape (Pikkarainen 2011). Here, one might particularly 
make reference to John Dewey as one of the early pragmatists to work in education 
(Olteanu 2015). In more recent years the study of semiotics or applications of 
semiotics to education has been termed ‘Edusemiotics’ (Semetsky 2014; Stables, 
Semetsky 2016). However, medicine as a subject for whatever reason has yet 
to feature heavily in relation to educational semiotics, with only a few papers 
connecting the two areas (Pauli et al. 2000a, 2000b, 2000c). 
One may not see too many parallels between medicine and semiotics as 
disciplines; however, if one considers how they are structured, a basic comparison 
can be made. In a conversation between Kalevi Kull and Umberto Eco, Eco remarks:
It is not a science [semiotics] in the way physics is a science because it is not 
accumu lative like science is. [...] So semiotics, I always say, is like medicine. [...] I 
think that semiotics is something like this – a confederation of disciplines, some-
times using diff erent methods, even though I am always ready to criticize one 
method and in this sense, it has no limits. (Kull 2017: 200)
One can see that structurally as a discipline (if indeed it is such), both medicine 
and semiotics contain a variety of heterogeneous, but linked specialties and areas, 
which may use diff erent methods. 
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Th is brings me to the primary mechanism for why semiotics might be a use-
ful frame to explore medical education and assessment4. An understanding of 
semiotics, particularly in the Peircean form, could help medical students to better 
deal with uncertainty in practice. Th is is because Peircean semiotics, through the 
conception of suprasubjectivity, has found a way to overcome the ontological 
distinction between mind-dependent and mind-independent being (Olteanu 
2015). If students can be taught to inculcate this thought process, it would help to 
reduce mental barriers to compartmentalizing objective and subjective knowledge. 
My reasons for making this statement are given in the following section. 
Suprasubjectivity 
Possibly the fi rst semiotician to talk about uncertainty and education was the 
pragmatist John Dewey (1859–1952). Th is position has drawn much attention 
(Biesta 1994, 2010; Biesta, Burbules 2003; Garrison 1994, 1997, 1998, 2003; 
Garrison, Shargel 1988; Wilshire 1993). Th e premise of Dewey’s approach is that 
thinking itself is fundamentally uncertain and that the only real antidote to this is 
refl ection (D’Agnese 2017). In Dewey’s own words: 
We do not approach any problem with a wholly naïve or virgin mind; we approach 
it with certain acquired habitual modes of understanding, with a certain store 
of previously evolved meanings, or at least of experiences from which meanings 
may be educed. If the circumstances are such that a habitual response is called 
directly into play, there is an immediate grasp of meaning. If the habit is checked, 
and inhibited from easy application, a possible meaning for the facts in question 
presents itself. (Dewey 1910: 106)  
Through the lens of reflection our habitual repositories of knowledge, from 
which we can draw to solve issues, grow. Th ese processes need to be continuously 
encultured in medical education, and refl ected in how doctors are assessed. Th ese 
ideas are well expressed by the following from D’Agnese: “[…] we should conceive 
of education not so much as the attempt to encompass and to master experience, 
but as the means to create new, unpredictable experience, thus putting forward our 
relationship with the environment” (D’Agnese 2017: 84).
4 I fully acknowledge that there are other semiotic approaches that lend themselves to this 
problem, such as explaining current issues in medical education in reference to the concept 
of umwelt. However, for brevity’s sake the works and implications of Jakob von Uexküll’s 
scholarship are not discussed in this paper. 
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Here education is seen as a process of adaptation (see Olteanu 2016, 2017) that 
might help the student overcome uncertainties and new issues, rather than a more 
linear and instrumental interpretation that would seek to train doctors to mimic 
pre-existing tasks performed in training once they graduate onto the hospital 
wards. Th is position is closer to viewing the central function of both education 
and assessment as engaging the student with the processes of learning rather than 
the attainment of particular grades, i.e. learning as process rather than a product 
(Lachman 1997), and assessment mechanisms that could capture this shift  in the 
function of learning, or, as John Dewey related, an education that can be free “from 
routine and from caprice” (Dewey 1917: 63). Similarly, and more currently, Strand 
(2013: 801) termed this process a “pedagogy of surprise” and Campbell (2016: 30) 
a “pedagogy of novelty”. 
A comprehension of the fundamental uncertainty of thought as expressed by 
Dewey and others helps to explain why medical humanities scholars have placed 
importance on the ideas of context within medicine. Naturally, then, if we are 
to help students engage with uncertainty in real world practice, they should be 
instructed in a manner that helps them understand and account for subjectivity. 
Perhaps the best approach to the reflective thought Dewey recommends is 
to ensure that education and assessment are informed by Peirce’s concept of 
suprasubjectivity (Olteanu 2015). 
Th e concept of suprasubjectivity was a means by which Charles Sanders Peirce 
attempted to resolve (and transcend) an on-going philosophical dispute between 
those who characterize existence as mind-dependent (ens rationis) and those who 
characterize it as mind-independent being (ens reale), i.e., between idealist and 
realist schools of thought. Such an approach tries to reconcile “scientifi c” (realist/
objective) knowledge with humanities subjects (idealist/subjective) interpretations 
of the world. For a much more in-depth debate around this issue see Deely 2000 
and Deely, Semetsky 2017. 
To unpack the concept of suprasubjectivity I will quote at length sections of text 
from Paul Bains’ Th e Primacy of Semiosis, as the idea cannot easily be reduced to a 
simple explanation. Much as Bourdieu (1990: 52) identifi ed, sometimes complex 
issues require in-depth explanation and should not be parsed, if the reader is to 
avoid a deformed understanding of the concept being explained.
From a suprasubjective position the concept of a sign is “neither strictly 
subjective, neither strictly objective” (Olteanu 2015: 24). We are here concerned 
instead with the ontology of relations within a system, for example: “[…] formal 
signs are posited to account for the function of ‘ideas’ or ‘concepts’ as being, not 
sense-perceptible, but rather factors which nevertheless bring into awareness 
something other than themselves, something suprasubjective” (Bains 2014: 50). 
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In the idea of ‘something other than ourselves’, the ‘supra-’ in suprasubjectivity, 
is essential to understanding the nature of the concept, i.e. signs are constituted 
as relations, and not a mere agglomeration of diff ering parts (Cobley 2017). Bains 
(2014: 11) describes this in the following way:
Th is is an expanded conception of subjectivity that included not only words and 
images but all the ‘machinations’ that go to make up those words and images. We 
are semiotic, existential territories rather than brains in vats, and these territories 
or ecologies are not contained within our physical anatomy, nor are they known 
only as immanent representations. Th e question becomes this: Where does your 
cognition or subjectivity terminate if it is a suprasubjective process and not a 
stable substance? Th e “self ” becomes a sign relation or interpretant rather than an 
unrelated ontological entity.  
Th e text continues:
What is being constantly emphasized is a kind of semiotic ontology in which 
relations become crucial at every level of analysis and allow for the interweaving 
of corporeal and incorporeal factors. Relations are an intrinsic dimension of 
being, and every being becomes the active centre of a web of relations, with other 
beings. Th e relations are, however, in what they are as relations, suprasubjective. 
Th ey are not reducible to the relative being that enters into or generates these 
relations. A dilemma of much thought is the diffi  culty of thinking beyond the One 
or the Many and entertaining the concept of a multiplicity of diff erent things or 
beings that are nevertheless in mobile relationships – the concept of a place where 
sometimes with the greatest diffi  culty, new relationships can be constructed. 
(Bains 2014: 11–12)
Th is statement demonstrate a paucity in the concept of intersubjectivity (Deely 
2009): i.e. what is properly subjective, is over and above us, not merely between 
things, namely, supra-subjective. Bains also describes the concept in relation to the 
works of João Poinsot (John of St Th omas), the 17th-century Portuguese Scholastic 
philosopher: 
[…] objective being as a pattern of univocal5 relations, some of which may also at 
the same time be physical relations. In this sense, objective being is not represen-
tative. It is not a middle term that is known fi rst then on the basis of which 
something else might be known. It is a pure ‘non-mediating’ relation – it does not 
get in the way. Th us, Poinsot seeks to retain a certain Th omistic realism, while at 
the same time, and perhaps in spite of himself, he opens the way for a semiotics in 
which concepts are formal signs that bring into awareness something other than 
5 See Deleuze 1990.
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themselves – but these ‘objects’ need not have extramental, physical existence, or 
they may mix up physical and ideal being. (Bains 2014: 10) 
To this statement I would also relay the words of John Deely (2014: 593): “[…] 
that what underlies the possibility of semiosis in the fi rst place at any level is the 
irreducibility of relations to subjectivity (including intersubjectivity)”. To open 
ourselves up to relational forms of experience, involves a movement beyond 
conceptualizing persons as being a middle term between a sign and its terminus. 
Drawing from Cobley (2017), a further illustration of this distinction is given by 
John Deely (2015: 20) in the following hypothetical scenario: 
We are supposed to meet for dinner; you show up and I don’t (or vice versa), 
and you are annoyed until you fi nd out that I died on the way to the dinner. At 
my moment of death, at the moment I ceased to have a material subjectivity 
encounterable in space and time, the relation between us went from being 
intersubjective as well as suprasubjective to being only suprasubjective; yet under 
both sets of circumstances I (or you) as the objective terminus of the dinner 
engage ment remained suprasubjective (if not intersubjective!) as a constant 
infl uencing the behavior of the one still living in whom the relation retained a 
subjective foundation as a cognitive state provenating the relation as supra-
subjectively terminating at an “other”.
To clarify the concept of suprasubjectivity further, I will give some concrete 
examples of where approaches to medical education have (unknowingly) utilized 
this approach. Th e purpose of introducing suprasubjectivity into medical education 
is to introduce a process by which medical students start to understand both their 
personal and professional practice as something other than themselves, in terms of 
the fact that they are connected within an ontology of relations (Jauernig 2010) to a 
multiplicity of things including their patients, tutors and a wider political/cultural 
and economic milieu. Specific examples of this milieu include technological 
advances in medicine, and increasing comorbidity in patients (Beddhu et al. 2000). 
In the language of Deleuze and Guattari, this is a student becoming aware that they 
exist within a wider “ethico-aesthetic paradigm” (Guattari 1995). 
This is a process that cannot be taught explicitly, but can be actively en-
cultured in students. Th at being said, we cannot force upon students a new and 
unpredictable experience and simply expect them to learn eff ectively from it, 
but we can in a Deweyan sense develop pedagogies that give the space and ‘the 
means to create new, unpredictable experience’ (D’Agnese 2017: 84), through which 
students can foster the skills of adaptation that are required in the real world of 
clinical practice. Th e question remains, in general terms, what might these new 
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and unpredictable experiences be? More specifi cally in semiotic terms, what might 
suprasubjectivity in medical education and assessment look like?
Threshold concepts
Some answers may be found in the pioneering work around threshold concepts in 
medical education. In relation to education, a threshold concept: 
[…] can be considered as akin to a portal, opening up a new and previously 
inaccessible way of thinking about something. It represents a transformed way of 
understanding, or interpreting, or viewing something without which the learner 
cannot progress. As a consequence of comprehending a threshold concept there 
may thus be a transformed internal view of subject matter, subject landscape, or 
even world view. (Meyer, Land 2003: 415)
Semiotically, what are here described as threshold concepts, are the processes by 
which a student cognitively begins to access suprasubjective sign relations, that allow 
a diff ering perception of self, and one’s wider environment. Th e student undergoes 
an ontological shift  in relation to their own being, but also potentially in relation to 
the external world as well, or as Bains (2014: 10) describes it: “Th e “self ” becomes a 
sign relation or interpretant rather than an unrelated ontological entity.” 
What then might these shift s or threshold concepts look like? If they are in fact 
suprasubjective experiences, I suggest they can be either physical (extramental), non-
physical (intramental), or a mixture of both. In addition to this, when exploring 
threshold concepts with students at Peninsula Medical School, Collett, Neve, and 
Stephen (2017) discovered the following examples with their clinical students:
 No single or morally correct answer: you might not always be able to 
provide the right answer to a patient.
 Being a doctor is more than just treating the symptoms: you cannot as a 
student just be smart, you have to develop a relationship with the patient.
 It’s about the patient: the needs of patient outweigh the needs of the 
student.
 Working with uncertainty: knowing what to do isn’t always clear.
Building on Wearn, O’Callaghan, and Barrow (2016) it is also important to high-
light a threshold concept discovered by Randall (2017):
 You can’t save everybody. Some of your patients will die.
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Th is threshold is typically passed when a student experiences their fi rst patient 
dying. Th is is a particularly salient example, as one of the key features of threshold 
concepts is that the eff ect on the student is deemed to be irreversible (Meyer, Land 
2005, 2006), which one would expect when the student fi rst experiences their 
inability to prevent death. Equally, the crossing of liminal thresholds is also known 
to be troublesome (Meyer, Land 2003; Perkins 2006). Th is is something Bains 
(2014: 11–12) also observed about suprasubjectivity when he stated: 
A dilemma of much thought is the diffi  culty of thinking beyond the One or the 
Many and entertaining the concept of a multiplicity of diff erent things or beings 
that are nevertheless in mobile relationships – the concept of a place where some-
times with the greatest diffi  culty, new relationships can be constructed.  
Intriguingly, Baines used scholastic philosophy to draw the same conclusion that 
Meyer and Land (2003) did, via collecting and analysing primary data. To give an 
illustrative example of what passing through a suprasubjective/threshold process 
might be like, we can turn to Neve et al. (2016: 850), who detail the following 
scenario between a student (pseudonym Kate) and her clinical tutor: 
Prior to threshold change:
You have been Kate’s academic tutor since she started at medical school 18 
months ago. One of your roles is to support her to develop her refl ective writing, a 
requirement of the programme’s professionalism module. Kate has been resistant 
to the idea of refl ective practice and you are not hopeful about your meeting this 
aft ernoon. She says that she cannot see the point of refl ection and that the task is 
just “a hoop to jump through”.
Aft er threshold change:
When Kate arrives today, things are diff erent. “I’ve got it!” she says “I fi nally get 
refl ection!” Sure enough, her latest piece is insightful and analytical—she has 
written about her feelings and assumptions, explored dilemmas and considered 
others’ perspectives. You discuss what she has learnt about being a patient and 
the kind of doctor she hopes to become. She shows you an App that she has 
downloaded to record future refl ections on her smartphone. Aft er 18 months, 
her view of refl ective practice has, it seems, been transformed; she has crossed a 
threshold and navigated a troublesome concept in learning.
Th is story contains introspection, a consideration of the other, and future aspira-
tions of the student. It also points to the use of physical items (phone apps) as well 
as cognitive changes. Th ese examples appear to reify the qualities and materials 
described by Bains that constitute the basis of suprasubjectivity, which seems to 
support the idea of suprasubjectivity as a transcendental process of emerging 
ontological relations being the basis for such changes. 
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It should be stated that another similarity between educational semiotics 
(Olteanu 2015: 28) and threshold concepts is that learning in terms of crossing 
threshold boundaries is a non-linear, recursive process (Cousin 2006). On top of 
this, Neve et al. (2016: 851) relate that threshold concepts will allow tutors to “learn 
to distinguish superfi cial understanding and mimicry from mastery, noticing 
where students are stuck, uncertain or confused”.
From the semiotician’s perspective, the term ‘mastery’ in the above statement 
could easily be described as semiosis. In the sense that mimesis6 is distinct from 
semiosis (Zlatev 2013), although mimesis can account for creative processes 
(Maran 2003), it is semiotics, as a sign-cognitive process that allows some form of 
paradigm shift  to occur within the students (Zlatev, Andrén 2009). Hence, then, 
the diff erence between mastery and apprenticeship is the diff erence between a 
mimetic and a semiotic understanding of the educational process. In this sense 
the depth of the relationship (semiotics being more complex than mere mimicry) 
determines its usefulness as a carrier of meaning (Uexkülll 1934). 
Figure 2. A suprasubjective interpretation of medical education and assessment.
6 Mimesis is the process through which visual patterns are matched to the real world, without 
reinterpretation. See Neiva 1999.
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Assessment drives learning, as George E Miller’s adage states. Noting this, the 
medical educator is tasked with ensuring that the skills taught to students are useful 
in the real world of clinical practise. Fig. 2 illustrates the tensions that exist in 
terms of trying to fi nd approaches to education and assessment that produce good 
doctors. Medical assessment is concerned that variables V1, medical education, 
and V2, assessment, are congruent, in that the assessment accurately captures the 
skills necessary to teaching students. However, there is a missing link, in that the 
assessments which medical students take do not adequately prepare them for the 
external realities of clinical practise (dashed line between V2 and V3). In other 
words, how the more sheltered (and more predetermined) world of education, 
can suffi  ciently represent the real world of clinical practice, in order to facilitate a 
seamless transition into it for aspiring medical professionals, remains a question. 
Considering Fig. 2, the ideal situation would be for variables V1, V2 and V3 all 
to be representative of one another. Th e challenge is that both medical education 
and medical practice require doctors to draw upon both objective and subjective-
contextual knowledge, but currently the majority of medical assessment does not. 
Even at this rudimentary level, one can see that using semiotics as a meta-theory 
to plan the delivery of educational services in relation to an intentional goal (i.e. 
becoming a good doctor) can benefi t from Peirce’s oft en cited and perhaps most 
straightforward defi nition of the sign: 
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something 
in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of 
that person an equivalent sign or perhaps a more developed sign. Th at sign which 
it creates I call the interpretant of the fi rst sign. (CP 2.228) 
Th e quote clarifi es the necessary structures that are required in medical education 
if we are to reform it, in order to meet the changing standards and requirements 
of our current age. Instead of a continuation of conservative institutional practices 
that tend towards re-enforcing existing patterns of behaviour, semiotics can 
account for the impingement of external actors (i.e. patient need, regulatory 
pressure etc.) that have a role to play in how we educate doctors of the future. 
Once more referring to Fig. 2, semiotics allows us to consider the appropriate 
relationships pertinent to how the intersubjective and suprasubjective interact. 
Th e only way that this can happen is if medical assessment is brought in line 
with medical practice and education by incorporating more subjective assessments 
that test a student’s ability to handle uncertainty, as indicated by John Dewey, and 
the pioneering work that is happening in Holland (Schuwirth, Van Der Vleuten 
2011). I believe that this can be achieved by teaching students about threshold 
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concepts, and integrating them into their assessments. For instance Randall (2017) 
has created refl ective essay tasks for students that revolve around known threshold 
concepts. 
From this perspective, reflective practice needs to be embedded both in 
medical education and assessment so that doctors are adequately trained to 
function meaningfully in the real world. Th is can only really be done from a 
suprasubjective interpretation of medical education. It also helps to counter the 
conception of medical humanities that encourage refl ection as a merely decorative 
addendum. Rather, these examples help us assert that we can see how semiotics 
off ers us the ability to structure and scaff old entire educational systems, making 
it a fundamental part of teaching doctors how to orientate themselves to the 
clinical environments that are increasingly profl igate with new uncertainties and 
challenges. Although this paper concerns medical education, it has potential 
implications for other areas of professional education e.g., other clinical subjects, 
teachers, emergency services, etc. 
Additionally, in this paper, I have sought to connect assessment and education 
as a united process rather than analysing the semiotics of education separately from 
assessment. I would contend that one area of future development in educational 
semiotics is to explore how assessment can be explained in a semiotic context, and 
its relationship to teaching and learning. 
Conclusion
One might ask, why pursue this issue? Fundamentally, it would seem that current 
approaches to assessment within medical education are not sustainable in the long 
term. Following along the lines of Holmboe, it seems that ideological divisions are 
unhelpful in terms of designing medical education and assessment for the future. 
He remarked: 
At the current time, too much of the educational discourse revolves around many 
“either–or” polarities or dichotomies, such as high-stakes tests versus work-based 
assessments, quantitative versus qualitative approaches to assessment, reductio-
nism versus holism, process versus outcome, and so forth. Such either–or argu-
ments are typically unhelpful – engaging in them oft en makes for a fun ideo logical 
exercise but in the end does not move the fi eld forward or ultimately help patients. 
(Holmboe 2017: 3)
As such, I do not see medical humanities as an irreconcilable opposite to biological 
science, but instead as an area that needs to be integrated into a cohesive whole, 
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with other subjects in a wider medical curriculum. Th e idea of suprasubjectivity 
as a structure or blueprint allows us to move towards this goal. 
Both Holmboe (2017) and Kuhn (1962) noted that paradigm shift s can be 
messy, both for those looking to change to a new paradigm, but also for those 
wanting to remain within the current system. It would seem that the ontological 
shifts associated with threshold concepts embody this messiness, as they are 
characterized by traumatic or personally defining events, such as the first 
experience of a patient dying. 
At the beginning of this paper, the question was asked what attributes and skills 
are required to make a good doctor. Having established that the quantifi cation of 
assessment and outcome data can only take us so far in answering this interroga-
tive, one can see why there is a desire for a paradigm shift  in medical educa-
tion, where one can both qualify and quantify the answers to this question. Th e 
qualifi cation is best found in approaching medical education and assessment from 
a refl ective, humanistic position, specifi cally by designing educational practices 
and assessments that situate medical students’ learning within a suprasubjective 
context of sign relations. A practical example of this is the use of threshold concepts 
to determine the critical events that students pass through on their journey to 
becoming clinical professionals. By taking this approach I do not reject the validity 
of psychometrics, statistics or other quantitative approaches used in medical 
education, but rather acknowledge its epistemological limits, much as I must 
acknowledge the limits of “soft  sciences” in medical education (Dacey, Wintrob 
1973; Begun, Rieker 1980). Both have a role to play in mainstream medical 
education, and work should be undertaken to integrate both epistemological 
positons under a meta-level semiotic perspective, such as the scholastic realism 
of Charles Sanders Peirce and John Deely, that transcends stale dualistic (realist-
idealist) approaches by acknowledging that an objective, physical, biological reality 
exists, but within a system of suprasubjective sign relations. 
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Может ли семиотика стимулировать изменения парадигмы 
в медицинском образовании? 
Статья намеревается объяснить, каким образом семиотика образования как дис-
ци пли на может использоваться в реформе медицинского образования, которая 
стремится объединять более качественные, этические и профессиональные аспекты 
медицины в учебные планы и развивать способы оценить их. Полагается, что метод 
для стимулирования изменения парадигмы мог бы быть найден в пирсовской идее 
супрасубъективности. Это семиотическое понятие внедрено в схоластической 
философии Джона Пуансо, но было вновь введено в современную семиотику в работах 
Пирса, Джона Дили и Алин Олтеану. Как преподаватель медицины и семиотик я имею 
доступ и к информации об изменениях парадигмы в медицинском образовании и 
к понятию супрасубъективности в современной образовательной семиотической 
литературе. Считаю, что супрасубъективный подход к медицинскому образованию и 
оцениванию мог бы быть крайне полезным. В медицинском образовании существенным 
недостатком является напряжение, возникающее от стремления научить будущих врачей 
пониманию равновесия между биологической научностью и этическими суждениями, 
вытекающими из конкретной ситуации. Именно схоластическая философия Джона 
Пуансо может быть решением, в котором нуждается медицина для преодоления этой 
дихотомии. 
Kas semiootikat saab kasutada, et käivitada paradigmamuutusi 
meditsiinihariduses?
Artikli eesmärgiks on selgitada, kuidas haridussemiootikat kui distsipliini saab kasutada 
meditsiinihariduse ja hindamise reformis. See on vastus käimasolevale paradigmanihkele 
meditsiinihariduses ning hindamises, milles püütakse lõimida meditsiini kvalitatiivseid, 
eetilisi ja professionaalseid aspekte õppekavadesse ning töötada välja viise nende hindamiseks. 
Artiklis osutatakse, et ühe meetodi selle paradigmamuutuse käivitamiseks võib leida Peirce’i 
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suprasubjektiivsuse ideest. Selle semiootilise mõiste juured ulatuvad João Poinsot’ skolastilisse 
fi losoofi asse, ent see on semiootikas taas kasutusele võetud John Deely, Alin Olteanu ja varem 
Charles Sanders Peirce’i teostes. Lähenen sellele ülesandele nii meditsiiniõppejõu kui ka 
semiootikuna. Artiklis kirjeldan meditsiiniharidust, paradigmanihkeid ja suprasubjektiivsuse 
mõistet puudutavat taustteavet seotuna tänapäevase haridussemiootilise kirjandusega. Toon 
näiteid selle kohta, milline võiks välja näha suprasubjektiivne lähenemine meditsiiniharidusele 
ja hindamisele. Teen seda, võrdustades semiootilise läve ning suprasubjektiivsuse mõisteid ja 
näidates sarnasusi nende vaatepunktide vahel. Meditsiinihariduses on oluliseks puuduseks 
pinged, mis tekivad püüetest õpetada arstitudengitele bioloogilise teaduslikkuse ning situat-
sioonist lähtuvate eetiliste otsustuste vahelist tasakaalu. Vaimust sõltuva ja vaimust sõltumatu 
olemise ületamises võib Poinsot’ skolastiline fi losoofi a olla täpselt see lahendus, mida meditsiin 
vajab sellest dihhotoomiast üle saamiseks.
